tended to conduct operations using NATO resources or to implement anti-crisis measures autonomously.
During the November meeting in Luxembourg in 1999, the defense ministers of the EU member states discussed the structure of the European Union Rapid Reaction Force 7 . The meeting was preceded by consultations in the strict cycle consisting of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, during which the preliminary rules and ways of implementing the provisions of the upcoming Summit of Heads of State and Government in Helsinki were agreed 8 .
Decisions taken at the Cologne Summit and conclusion of the following discussions at a later stage were developed at the European Council meeting in Helsinki. On the 10 th -11 th December 1999, European leaders accepted the report of the Finnish Presidency on developing the EU's response capability in the event of a military crisis as part of joint and strengthened cooperation in security and defense policy 9 . It was decided then that member states cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations would be able until 2003 to designate within 60 days and maintain for at least one year armed forces consisting of 50 to 60 thousand people in the area of operation, capable of performing the full range of the so-called Petersberg tasks. Within the European Union Council, new political and military structures would be created to enable the European Union to develop the necessary political guidelines and the concept of anti-crisis operation. It was decided to create a non-military mechanism for crisis management in order to coordinate the usage of the European Union, in parallel to the military capabilities and civilian resources of the member states 10 .
In the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the aim of which was to gradually develop defense capabilities, it was planned to create, on the basis of the Cologne Declaration, military assets that were in fact limited to carrying out tasks in the field of managing crises of military nature. However, the adopted solution could result in further narrowing of the developed concept to humanitarian operations 11 In spite of the substantial lack of ability to respond to crisis situations at the set level, in June 2003 the European Council declared full capacity to carry out Petersberg tasks 13 .
In December 2003, during the meeting of the European Council in Brussels, the document entitled "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy" was adopted, which outlined directions for development and informed about the role the EU was going to play on the international arena in the future 14 . Multilateral actions based on cooperation with existing international organizations were part of the basis for counteracting threats identified in the prepared strategy 15 . In the field of practical action it was decided to rely on the implementation of conclusions of the French military operation "Artemis" in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for which the European Union took responsibility 16 . Based on the experience from its implementation, it was decided to apply a new concept of shaping EU military resources for anti-crisis measures. The use of combat groups of about 1,500 soldiers with appropriate logistic facilities in order to react quickly to the emerging international crisis was assumed 17 . 
ACTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AGAINST THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE
Ukraine, since it gained independence, has been an important partner for the European Union in Eastern Europe, especially in the post-Soviet security area 24 . The leaders of the EU member states declare paying close attention to the institutionalization of contacts in the sphere of political life, including the field of broadly understood security.
The European Union has endeavored to stop the development of armed conflict, preserve territorial integrity and ensure security for the Ukrainian citizens. The preparation of a political association with Ukraine and her economic integration with the EU member states was one of the means to achieve the aforementioned objectives by the European Union. Ukraine is one of the main partners in the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine signed on 14 th June 1994 that entered into force in 1998 and expired in 2008 was the basis for cooperation and reforms in the main areas of reform 25 . Simultaneously in 1998, the first meeting of the Cooperation Council between Ukraine and the EU was held, during which Ukraine representatives formally announced their accession to gain the status of the EU associated country 26 . An important event in the European Union-Ukraine relations was undoubtedly the adoption of the Joint EU Ukrainian Strategy at the EU summit in Helsinki on 11 th December 1999, which was extended until December 2004 27 . Joint fight against threats to stability and security in Europe, environmental protection, energy and nuclear security have been the main tasks listed in it 28 . Afterwards, a number of sectorial documents were signed, including ones on security 29 . In 2003, during the Yalta Summit, it was decided to startconsultations in order to implement the Wider Europe Action Plan for Ukraine, which also covered the issues of nuclear safety, fight against terrorism and organized crime 30 . In 2009, the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda entered into force, which replaced the former Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 31 . The principal objective of the new initiative was to prepare for the implementation of the Association Agreement (AA), an integral part of which was the creation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the European Union 32 . The change in Ukraine's internal situation in January 2010 resulted in the refusal to sign the association agreement by President Victor Yanukovych during the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. The events that followed this decision and when the Ukrainian militia brutally dispersed the demonstrators gathered at the Independence Square in Kiev on 30 th November 2013, led not only to a change of power in the state but also to reorientation of the overall politics of Ukraine, both on the internal and external arena. The signing of the political part of the Association Agreement took place on 21 st March 2014 and the second part on 27 th June the same year. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Supreme Council of Ukraine) approved the agreement ratification on 16 th September 2014 and the President signed it on the same day 33 . The effective functioning of the agreement between Ukraine and the European Union on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which is a central part of the sign Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, has been the consequence of that since 1 st January 2016.
Another important task for the European Union has been ensuring the stability of both the internal and external security in Ukraine. The events initiated by the attempt to suppress pro-European demonstration on 31 st November 2013 in Kiev and further escalation of the use of force by security forces led to the involvement of the EU bodies responsible for security policy in counteracting negative efforts of the dynamically evolving situation. The intervention of the European Union authorities was mainly a result of the great support of the demonstrators for European values and preventing negative consequences of the large-scale use of violence in the already developing internal conflict that occurred in the immediate vicinity of the European Union borders. The fear of losing the image of an effective arbitrator capable of suppressing any conflict effectively, especially when one of the parties to the dispute defends the values declared in the EU's strategic documents, seems to be the further inspiration for the EU's commitment to solving the situation in Ukraine 34 . Failure in this regard would ultimately undermine the role of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as a tool of the European Union for ensuring its status as a "superpower", at least at a regional 31 level as well as a way to spread the Western European model of integration in the area of security. The representatives of the highest authorities of the European Union repeatedly called on the parties to the conflict to refrain from using force in confrontation and advocated resolving the conflict through political dialogue in cooperation with regional security organizations 35 . However, their efforts at the turn of 2013/2014 were fruitless, especially in the face of firearms use by the government and casualties among demonstrators. In the face of growing violence, the EU Council decided to introduce sanctions against all those responsible for the use of violence and violations of basic human rights in the ongoing conflict on the streets of Kiev. In particular, responsibility for the possibility to change the current state of security was entrusted to the president 36 . It seems that the simultaneous visit of the French, German and Polish foreign ministers at the request of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton in some way affected the suppression of the conflict and, as a consequence, the defeat of President V. Yanukovych 37 .
The defeat and escape of President V. Yanukovych meant political change and failure of the Russian Federation (RF) policy in Ukraine. The failure of the pro-Russian policy option in Kiev led to the implementation of a solution by the Russian politicians in the form of hybrid aggression. The variant of intervention in Ukraine by its Eastern neighbor was implemented according to the planned and prepared model of a foreign power intervention, affecting the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine 38 .
On 26 th February 2014 in Crimea, militant groups of allegedly unknown origin began occupying or blocking strategic and operational objects in order to counter "illegal" takeover or destruction. In reality, it was a demonstration of regular Russian troops and RF Special Forces acting as local paramilitary groups preventing the alleged persecution of the Russian-speaking minority by the members of the Right Sector. In the face of an act of aggression in violation of the UN Charter, the OSCE Final Act, the breach of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and the 1997 Bilateral Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Agreement, the European Union Council condemned the actions of the Russian Federation and called for the withdrawal of her troops from the territory of Ukraine as well as to begin acting in accordance with international law in order to resolve the conflict 39 43 . The response of the EU Council was to deepen the sanctions and condemn the illegal referendum in Crimea that had broken the Ukrainian constitution 44 .
The next stage of the Russian Federation's aggression towards Ukraine was the destabilization of her Eastern part, also largely dominated by the Russian-speaking population. Informal armed groups that were linked to or inspired by the new regime carried out acts of terror against groups of people and local activists who remained loyal to the Ukrainian central institutions. There were plans to carry out terrorist acts of criminal nature aimed at the Ukrainian-speaking population and perform terrorist activities directed against representatives of the international community. After the implementation of the plan already known from operations in the Crimean Peninsula and after the limited actions taken by the Ukrainian central authorities, the aggressors decided to undertake a military operation 45 . Local the so-called self-defense forces, foreign "volunteers" and subdivisions composed of soldiers of the regular military forces of the Russian Federation undertook full-scale combat operations using modern and advanced military equipment 46 , whose affiliation was sought to be hidden in the first days of fighting in order to legitimize itself as a party to a non-international armed conflict 47 .
Deploying a large number of Russian troops near the eastern border of Ukraine and conducting military trainings in the immediate vicinity of the Ukrainian-Russian border as well as the indirect, although often direct, support of the separatist parties fighting in eastern Ukraine significantly determined the conservative actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and consequently the failure of the Ukrainian counterterrorist operation in 2014 48 . Attempts to solve the problem of hybrid aggression with military tools in the eastern part of the Donbas region by Ukraine herself, despite the initial success and recovery of a part of the territory by the Ukrainian government, failed. The symbol of this failure was the defeat in the "Battle of Ilovaisk" and its tragic consequences for the Ukrainian forces 49 .
Since the beginning of the conflict the new Ukrainian authorities and its European neighbors were making every effort to involve the EU bodies responsible for security in this domestic, although in the essence having an external intervention character, conflict. At the same time, actions taken by the EU should be institutionalized. However, the main problem was the scope of assistance and the nature of support granted. The political tools used by the EU authorities at that point were unsuccessful and were ignored by the separatists motivated by the Russian Federation in this area 50 . The Russian side sought to talk only with selected partners. The effectiveness of her efforts manifested itself in the creation of the so-called "Normand" formula of meetings that resulted in the protocol signed in Minsk in 2014 as well as the agreement in the following year 51 . All arrangements for peaceful settlement of the conflict were created in the conditions shaped by the self-proclaimed authorities of republics in the eastern Ukraine under the dictation of their Russian superiors. The European community could only be represented by France and Germany that were chosen by the Russian administration, which revealed the place and role of the EU authorities in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation and the attitude of her diplomacy towards the CFSP repre-
sentatives. An intensive debate was held in the European environment dealing with international security on practical and effective ways of involving the EU institutions in the ongoing armed conflict, not only to monitor its progress but, in prospect, conflict parties separation and control of possible armistice 52 . The possibility of using the armed forces as part of a possible European Union mission seemed illusory 53 .
The response of the international community to the events in eastern Ukraine was primarily based on establishing and organizing an OSCE monitoring mission in this region 54 . A special civilian mission with the OSCE mandate operates in Donbas, whose main task is to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreement concluded in Minsk in February 2015. Representatives of the OSCE are also mediating in talks between the Ukrainian authorities and the separatist forces within the so-called contact group. However, the activities of the OSCE mission from the beginning encountered problems caused by the parties to the conflict, especially the separatist forces. Authorities of the republics formed in eastern Ukraine tried to hide the movement to eastern Ukraine of Russian military means and personnel, which were used against the Ukrainian government forces. The OSCE mission does not seem to fulfill its tasks and objectives to the outmost, but at the same time it must be acknowledged that it operates under complex political conditions and under the pressure of Russian actions destabilizing its effectiveness.
Observers from the international community have repeatedly stressed the lack of possibility of an effective OSCE mission. Multiple interventions and remarks by European representatives bring only a temporary effect. In order to counter the Russian influence, it was decided to reinforce the actions of the European community by announcing the possibility of sending a civilian mission to Ukraine under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which was discussed at an informal meeting of EU heads of diplomacy. The task of the new mission was, in the first place, to support the activities of the observation mission launched earlier by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The mission was to cover projects related primarily to the judiciary reform and the police, thus ensuring stability of power and restoring the Ukrainian public trust in public security organs weakened by corruption and fraud. 55 . The EU mission in Ukraine officially started on 1 st December 2014 with the aim of assisting the Ukrainian government and local government administration in reforming the security sector. The main task of the EUAM mission is to rebuild the state public security organs and to improve the functioning of the Ukrainian courts and prosecutors. The strategic goal of the reform is to restore the confidence of the Ukrainian citizens in civilian security organs.
Activities of the EUAM mission in Ukraine are based on strategic consulting on rebuilding the civil security organs, consulting on the operational level, training, implementing projects and cooperation and coordination of undertaken reforms and actions between the Ukrainian side and international organizations. The priorities set for the mission are, above all, separation of functions and tasks between the authorities in order to avoid duplication of competence and achieve partnership in relations with society. At the same time, the mission seeks to guarantee the right to freedom of assembly and that the actions of services in those areas are in line with European standards and respect for human rights. The priority is to strengthen the ability of security bodies to conduct criminal cases, in particular those related to corruption offenses 56 .
CONCLUSIONS
The aforementioned mission is a testament to the capability of the European Union authorities for addressing conflicts that arise at its borders and in particular in its immediate vicinity in Europe. Its character indicates the designed model of engaging this European organization in solving crises. This is complementary to the current global or regional powers. The European Union should increase its involvement in shaping security in states where it intends to engage politically and economically in the future. If the European Union intends to play a key role in managing crises of military nature, the priority of its action should be ensuring survival and consolidation of threatened states effectively and, at the second stage, development of high standards of state management. The main task of the government administration in Ukraine is to achieve efficiency in law enforcement, In assessing the involvement of the European Union authorities in resolving the conflict in Ukraine in the field of such an important area of security, the internal conditions of the EU should be taken into account. The limitations to functioning of this organization in the international environment, as a collection of sovereign states, should be borne in mind. The activity of the European Union must be based on the consensus and take into account the diversity of national interests of the member states. At the same time, taking on international action, it should validate commonly declared and promoted universal values. The idealistic approach to many issues of relations between states and nations is, however, verified in the face of the pragmatics of shaping international relations.
In circumstances such as conflicts, a lot depends also on the party that is trying to influence behind the scenes the actions taken by the European Union authorities in relation to a state in a situation such as Ukraine. In this case, an entity like the Russian Federation rarely takes into account and even avoids direct relations with bodies of international organizations that may take initiatives contrary to her interests. Russian decision-makers prefer bilateral relations, especially with partners who have influence in European organizations due to their political, economic or military potential. With this kind of involvement of a party, which has decisive strength in shaping security in Eastern Europe, the effectiveness of international organizations authorities will be low or just symbolic. The main issue is also the way in which the EU member states deal with the Russian Federation. Discussion in a limited group, formed by the third side of the crisis, which stimulates the conflict behind the scenes, becomes the only solution to solve the conflict. The indirect appreciation of the EU largest member states and the prospect of "exclusive" relations with the Russian Federation could seem tempting to many politicians from these countries. However, the only way to make the European Union effective is its unconditional unity in foreign policy, especially in the sensitive area of security. 
